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Department of Literary Theory



**Enyo Konstantinov Stoyanov**

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Prof. Dr. Todor Hristov, SU "St. Kliment Ohridski"

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Darin Tenev, SU "St. Kliment Ohridski"

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Boyan Manchev, NBU

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Maurice Fadel, NBU

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Raya Kuncheva, IL-BAS

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## Introduction

The present study represents an attempt to address the new in and through literature based on the conceptual resources provided through the perspective of the notion of invention. Moreover, it aims to theoretically clarify the new in the light of a dialectic between literature and invention set in motion by it. Literature and invention in the history of their conceptualization undergo transformations along a similar trajectory: literature walks the path from imitation to creativity, and invention passes from its determination of discovery to that of innovation. In the historical process of European culture, these two trajectories developed in parallel, but gradually began a converging movement oriented around the vanishing point of the new.

Even here, it is good to make the stipulation that when developing the thematization of the relationship between literature and invention, their identification is not sought, but rather the aim is to outline a logic of mutual complementarity, of reciprocal conditioning. The stake of the work is that this would allow to bring out some important points in the ontology of the new, given that it itself cannot be commented on directly. Any identification, recognition, designation of something as new, paradoxically inevitably takes the new away from it precisely because it establishes it, as it overlaps it with that which is in itself already established. This epistemological obstacle to access to the new is perhaps surmountable on the basis of an indirect approach to it, namely, one that addresses its conditions. The dynamic self-relationship between the semantic stocks of the conceptual trajectories involved in thinking about literature and invention constitutes this orientational axis of the condition of novelty that the study seeks to delineate.

Given the already mentioned cognitive inaccessibility, which any study placing the new in its focus is forced to admit, the present work resorts to a meta-theoretical commentary. This turns it into an attempt to interpretively extract from the history of the use of the concept of invention and the contemporary engagements in literary theory and philosophy with the problem of the new relevant conceptual moments with the intention of their productive assembly. Methodologically, this means that researcher feels obliged to find a participatory approach to his object, to reflexively take on aspects of invention itself in his operations. The history of European aesthetics offers a cognitive operation suitable for such participation in the constitution of its studied subject - the geometric method of "construction", which the German idealist Friedrich Schelling resorted to in his *Philosophy of Art*. Broadly speaking, construction is a form of proof by making what is to be demonstrated by it. Here we will isolate

from the philosophical baggage weighing on the method of construction this key moment of performativity of the argument. Hence, the present research will try to construct the invention as a cross-section of the readings of theoretical projects set in motion by it, but with the proviso that as a moment in this "construction" appear the many "reconstructions" of the important positings of the new unfolded in contemporary debates.

Of course, the concept of invention is not the obligatory and only way in which the new can be problematized in relation to literature. Numerous other conceptual configurations have already done this more than once in the history of literary thinking: imagination, defamiliarization, etc. Each of them constructs the new in and of literature in its own perspective. The ambition that drives the present study is to suggest not only the way in which the new works in literature, but also to outline the fundamental contribution of literature itself to our experience of the new. In this regard, the work finds itself in a certain proximity with probably the most distinct form of connecting literature and novelty: the perspective of the psychology of literary creativity, which has stable traditions in Bulgarian literary theory. It is towards creativity as rooted in the potentiality of the author's memory that the most recent Bulgarian-language monograph in this field, *Repetition and Creation* by Radosvet Kolarov, is directed. The perspective outlined in Kolarov's monograph is tempting and anticipates quite a few of the observations we are yet to unfold in connection with invention. However, limiting the question of the new and literature to the framework of an individual author's mental process, as in *Repetition and Creation*, risks missing important aspects of the cutting of the new into the field of literature at the pre-individual and supra-individual level.

The composition of the present study is mainly in accordance with its metatheoretical attitude. The selection of commented conceptual projects is guided by whether they thematize invention directly or indirectly – through focusing on the problem of the new in and of literature and art. The question of the historical interweaving of the above-mentioned semantic movements of the concepts of invention and mimesis has not been neglected either.

### **Chapter 1. Invention between Finding and Innovating**

The present chapter traces the genealogy of the concept of invention and the semantic deposits in the history of thinking about literature through concepts of mimesis and/or fiction to the threshold of the understanding of literature as creativity, established during the Romantic era.

In Roman rhetoric, *inventio* is one of the five "canons" of oratory, it is the field of discovering the topics for constructing a certain oratorical speech. In Latin, *inventio* conveys the semantic elements expressed by the ancient Greek word *εὕρισκω* – to discover, to find. In the period of Roman rhetoric, *inventio* is stabilized and systematized as the field related to the theme of the oratory: it is the field of preparation of the arguments, of the proofs that the other divisions of rhetoric will bring to fruition. The presumption is that in the "phase" of invention the speaker procures his themes and arguments. These semantic elements are commonly shared, sedimented semantic forms that can be adapted to any particular topic of speech, to be applicable in a wide range of contexts. From here follows the most essential thing about the concept of *inventio* during the period of Antiquity and subsequently during the Middle Ages: it does not include the idea of something new, but on the contrary - the word marks a relationship with an already established, always already predetermined meaning.

It is significant that next to this ancient understanding of invention, there is another concept that was used during this period (and was also imposed by the Greeks) in connection with poetic art. Of course, we are referring to the idea of imitation, of *mimesis*, rendered in Latin as *imitatio*. Mimesis in its ancient definition, of course, also by default does not imply that the poet is the creator of something new. Moreover, in the understanding of art as imitation, a conceptual core is established, on the basis of which art (and primarily poetic art) is thought through its cognitive function.

In Plato, who systematically substantiates the concept of mimesis for the first time in Greece (undoubtedly stepping on conceptual gestures already established in cultural practice), poetic imitation has no cognitive value beyond the circumstance of its own *derivation* from what is known in it, but alongside thereby subverting itself with a residue of something *non-derivative*, which solidifies it by admitting the so-called *phantasmata*, appearances without ontological lining.

With Aristotle, we have rather a complication. His interpretation of mimesis as interacting not so much with an actual prototype, but above all with the possible, shifts the trajectory of the concept in another direction, although in the end it still subjects it to predetermination, to pre-giveness. But Aristotle's desire is to emphasize the cognitive contribution of the activity of the poets, the defense of the poetic art that he tries to build, aims to accommodate illusion, appearance, in a form that nevertheless has a cognitive value. Aristotle is trying to show that certain objects remain unknowable unless they are replaced by an

illusion of them, which is to say by breaking down their actuality. We can refer this statement to the more general formulations of the ancient thinker. The possible is available for direct observation only if it is acted upon, actualized, made actual. This also applies to possible suffering, as the real object of tragic imitation - Aristotle seems to be trying to suggest that without tragedy and its plot, we would only know about it based on the sight of someone actually suffering. Poetic art is probably thought of by him as saving this high price for epistemological benefits. The knowledge invested in poetic imitation in Aristotle is in fact simultaneously in two directions - on the one hand, we have knowledge of objects that recede from knowability when they are actual. On the other hand, we also have the self-referencing of the image as knowledge that it itself gives us about itself. This second cognitive direction, this self-referencing of imitation, secures the semblance rooted in it, insofar as it reveals it precisely as semblance. This is what Aristotle suggests with his repeated insistence that the poet, like the artist, always beautifies, i.e. it makes what it thematizes more beautiful than it actually is. This illusory beauty signals to the audience the de-actualization of the praxis that tragedy represents, i.e. its apparent actuality. But, as Aristotle suggests, if actuality is taken away through this frank semblance, what remains as a cognitive residue is non-illusory, but quite complete, knowledge of possibility. Of course, what is possible for Aristotle is predetermined, which is precisely why he can allow himself to speak of knowledge in this case. Possibilities for him are always ready-made, possibilities that are subject to realization or not, but always given.

It turns out that for both Plato and Aristotle poetic imitation remains without a dimension of novelty, although the phantasm in the former and the cancellation of actuality in the latter keep the notion of mimesis open to possible modifications. This openness, which prevents imitation from collapsing into a mere mechanical reproduction of the given, gives rise to the conditions for its uptake and deployment by concepts that have yet to impinge on the theme of mimesis. One of these concepts will turn out to be invention. Despite the proximity shared between the two concepts, based on the predetermined nature of the subject to which they are oriented, in the ideas of Antiquity they are thought of as separate from each other, but their coordinates set during this period will allow their gradual integration. In Roman antiquity, uses of *inventio* in relation to poetry are rare: Horace, for example, mentions the legend of Thespis inventing [*invenisse*] tragedy, and Cicero comments on the invention of poetry itself by predecessors of Homer. Nowhere, however, *inventio* in this sense of inventing some art is used to create individual works. It is always about the art itself in the sense of *techne*, of *ars* - some technique in the sense of

knowing how to do something. It is a discovery, they have discovered the knowledge of how to make works, and in this discovery of art they have made this possibility visible to others – this is the dominant meaning of *inventio* in these uses as well. The only "newness" here is that there is new knowledge at the moment of discovery. The overcoming of the distance between the realms of rhetoric and poetics as arts in Antiquity began only with the establishment of the Roman Empire, which tightened the sociopolitical conditions that had previously helped rhetoric to flourish—the new political regime narrowed the possibilities of free expression and simultaneously imposed a heavy bureaucratic apparatus that took away from the art of oratory its utilitarian function as a basis for making procedural decisions in the process of debates. From here, the only way out for rhetoric was to cast its concepts and tools in the other key area of speech techniques – poetry. Some final intersection of the two spheres occurred in the pedagogical practices of the medieval teachers of grammar, which led to a tight integration of the rhetorical concept of invention in commenting on the poetic activity. Our hypothesis is that precisely this meeting of the concept of invention with the poetic art and the problematic charge of mimesis, with which this art was equipped already in Antiquity, leads to the embedding of the dimension of the new in its semantics beyond reducing it to novelty in a purely cognitive sense. In other words, perhaps it is precisely literature that turns out to be the condition of the new in the form of the modern understanding of invention as referring to the production of a novel, non-predetermined object.

The Renaissance situation set significant changes in the relationship between the concepts of invention and mimesis. In the 16th century, a whole series of apologetics of poetry appeared, a testimony to the fact that its definiteness had lost its obviousness. This is also the time when the term "*fiction*" was finally established as an adequate translation of "*mimesis*", clarifying the still used Latin variant of translation with *imitatio*. This is particularly apparent in Sir Philip Sidney's *The Defence of Poesy*, where *fiction* is consistently used as an explicit translation of *mimesis*. For Sidney, all sciences follow nature, all knowledge follows the order given by nature, except poetry. The poet has stepped on invention as his support, it has become his property (it is "his own"), and so he makes new things, undiscoverable in nature. Poetry "*doth grow*" in another nature, it does not conform to nature, to what is given in that order which the sciences examine. What enables Sidney to think this particular engagement of poetry with the new is the protective frame of semblance emphatically emphasized in the very expression "fiction." For us, of particular importance here is this relation of fiction to invention as a basis, it



is here that the almost trivialized understanding of invention in literature as an act of creating fictions, including forms of representation, likeness and depiction, is created today. Invention finds a place among the resources for the "making" of poetry, and as an ability of the poet.

This subjectivization of the invention will intensify in the 17th century in Baroque poetics. Unlike classicism, which sought to affirm conventionality in poetry and rejected from it any novelty as a manifestation of extravagance, the baroque privileged the aesthetic effects of astonishment and wonder. In Spain, Baltasar Gracián imposed the concept of *ingenio*, "fertility", as the basis of poetry and as a kind of synonym for "invention", one of the main sources of the concept, which would become part of the vocabulary of the entire 17th century and especially of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century in relation to the creators of works of art - the concept of genius. In Gracián, *ingenio* already names a specific process of knowledge. The form of this particular cognitive activity is indicated as *agudeza* - "wit", sharpness as some immanent property of the mind. For him, it is inherent and, in this sense, founded in the "audacity of the inventive mind". Moreover, this change was accompanied by a complete withdrawal from the notion of invention as a technique, something that was reinforced by the other important author of Baroque poetics in the seventeenth century, Emanuele Tesauro. In his famous book *Aristotle's Telescope*, he would establish metaphor as a central manifestation of wit as a cognitive faculty, irreducible to intellectual forms of knowledge, while emphasizing the insistence in Aristotle's *Poetics* that the knowledge to make metaphors is not learned. Hence, wit becomes a natural gift, a talent for knowledge in the form of metaphors. Moreover, for Tesauro this cognitive leap to the new is actually a consequence of divine inspiration. God originally does exactly this with his already creative act - the created world is his metaphor, his act of synthesis, the totality of creation. Hence Tesauro deduces the circumstance that through wit, precisely through this cognitive faculty of man, who is the image and likeness of God in this respect, the created mind can also grasp the connections between things that seem at first sight unrelated and so restore and reproduce, at least to some extent, the unity of the world in his knowledge. By this man does not acquire a truly creative self-confidence either with Tesauro or Gracián, but he already has this opportunity to think himself as the likeness and image of God through something that resembles God's creative ability.

In the 18th century, the decisive transition in the perception of literature to the idea of creativity took place, accompanied by the synonymization between creativity and invention. This is mainly based on a rethinking of the concept of originality. At this point, the invention has already definitively been connected

with imitation, i.e. it has completely penetrated the understanding of poetry inherited from Antiquity, and at the same time begins to resonate with the pressure of transformation in which the very talk of imitation was entangled. Before the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the discourse on originality was entirely under the sign of the idea of imitation of nature in contrast to that of imitation of the ancients. Nature in the theory of imitation was the *origin* of poetry and its observation (*invention*) was the mode of its transformation into poetry. In his influential conception of beauty as referring to the source (*original*) rather than to the product, Lord Shaftesbury set one of the powerful directions of transforming this concept of originality. When he states that we should value the beauty of the source more than the beauty of the product, he ties this idea of source to the act of making.

This intertwining of originality and formation as activity would later be taken up in Edward Young's famous essay *Conjectures on Original Composition* from 1759. Young emphasized that imitating the ancients could be thought of as imitating the way the ancients were imitating. Since they had no poetic models to follow in their work, the ancients imitated "originally," i.e. the original source itself - nature. Accordingly, the moderns could, for Young, imitate the ancients, but only if they imitated the original, like them. However, this does not exhaust the semantic slippage that Young attempts to perform in relation to the dominant poetic categories. The primary source, nature, for Young is most accessible to "imitation" only on the basis of what is nature in the poet himself - his "genius", his natural talent. Genius for Young is a creative force, an aspect of nature as formative in the human subject. Creative nature, its power to form, ceases to be an object of representation, but becomes a condition of creation.

Young directly influenced the literary practices of the "*Sturm und Drang*" generation in Germany, including that generation's authoritative "cabbalistic" thinker Johann Georg Hamann. In his *Aesthetica in nuce*—a text more influential with its rhetoric than with its clear aesthetic argument—Hamann would introduce his famous thesis that poetry is "the mother tongue of the human race." In this work the "Magus of the North" developed the Christian thesis about man as the image and likeness of God in the direction of overturning the understanding of poetry as imitation to the status of creativity: for him, man is similar to God, his image, precisely as a creator, as poet. Through its rootedness in the Baroque understanding of wit as a spontaneous act of cognition, invention easily connected with the idea of a spontaneous act of creativity underlined here, due to its interweaving with the theme of originality. But in order to complete the stabilization of the transformation of the concept of invention into a kind of synonym for creativity, one more element was also

necessary - devaluation of the new in its purely cognitive functionality, preserved from Antiquity to and beyond the Baroque.

This displacement of purely cognitive novelty is traceable, for example, in Edmund Burke in his influential *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*. This essay begins by insisting that the new is not a satisfactory source of pleasure for the imagination, as it becomes a scarce and rapidly depleting resource. But Burke does not so much eliminate the new from his aesthetic reasoning as distributes its effects over various aspects of the beautiful and the sublime in order to compensate for its easy drying up as a source of impact. In the beautiful it is seen in its aspect of *repetition of change* (and only of change), and in the sublime - in the *surprise of the appearance of the expected*, grounded in the tension in its very expectation, traced by Burke in relation to one of the main sources of the sublime, which he describes: artificial infinity.

The withdrawal from the new as an independent form of aesthetic experience in Burke turns out to be an effect of the recognized easy exhaustion of sources of purely cognitive novelty. As we have seen, this awareness of the exhaustion of the new leads to the distribution of its effects in other categories of eighteenth-century aesthetics, including that historical axis to which Burke's aesthetics properly belongs (that of reworking the concept of imagination on the basis of experience with art, culminating in the notion of productive imagination of Kant and the Romantics), but at the same time liberates the new and hence invention to nestle comfortably in the terrain of notions of spontaneous creativity developed in the views of poetry by authors such as Young and Hamann. With this, the concept that we have followed up to now finally takes the path that ends in its modern semantics, which was imposed just in this period.

## **Chapter 2. The Aporias of Invention: Jacques Derrida**

As we have seen, the concept of "invention" began to imply some idea of novelty late, in the period between the 16th and the beginning of the 19th century it underwent a particular re-semanticization in a direction close to what we usually put into concepts such as creativity today. In this chapter, we will offer observations on a particular kind of contemporary reflection on the problematic of invention, including the particular semantic tension associated with its rethinking during the period of European modernity in contrast to its positing in ancient Roman rhetoric. This theme is taken up in a key essay by Jacques Derrida, "Psyché: Invention of the Other," where the French philosopher attempts a further re-semanticization, a particular internal switch in

the order of conditions that make possible the very talk of invention, crossing its entire genealogy.

In "Psyché," a text based on a series of lectures that Derrida gave in the United States in the 1980s, he reveals the circumstances in which he addresses the subject of invention as involving the *compulsion* to necessarily say something new about invention. This demand for invention about invention itself already outlines a paradox, a kind of exiting "impasse," around which Derrida will unfold his commentary. There is a particular aporia, as Derrida likes to call the situations in which he entangles the subjects he is commenting on. Derrida posits a performative tension around invention: it must begin with the demand that something new be said and so it will be an invention, but this implies *breaking some rule* because speaking the new appears extraordinary to the way it has been spoken before this moment. At the same time, Derrida suggests here that although invention implies the breaking of some rule, there is an *expectation* of invention in any such act of speaking, and this expectation is based on *conventions* of inventive speaking itself.

His next move is to address one of the ancient authors who most contributed to the institution of the *inventio* itself as a disciplinary part of rhetoric, namely Cicero. Cicero is involved here in connection with one of his works, *Classification of Oratory*, which is a particular kind of dialogue between himself and his son. Cicero's son asks his father for an explanation of the division of rhetoric, and his father, in response to this request of the son, rejoices. He is happy that the son has anticipated his own desire - the father's desire for the son to improve in his knowledge. The son himself asked what the father wanted, namely: to know as much as possible. This whole framework, in which the parts of the historical oratory are placed, is related to the question of anticipation on the part of the son of the desire called by Derrida the "narcissistic desire" of the father. Why narcissistic? Because in a certain sense, the idea here is about some kind of inheritance - for the son to be like the father, for the son to learn and be the same, to confirm the father, for the father to look at himself in the son; this is the desire of the father, and therefore it is narcissistic. But the son responded to this desire before it was addressed to him. Hence the father's joy as a sign of surprise at this anticipatory eagerness of his own expectation, of his own anticipation. The question is about the relation of the invention as entangled in a theme of the established, of the foundation of the new, even of its reproduction. Derrida seems to be saying that invention by default is thought of as something that is not *after*, is not, or should not be a matter of inheritance in the sense of derivation. This is a general statement of the question, but here a hint of where Derrida's argument will develop will

appear in the form of a counter-question: is not the son an absolute invention? By *absolute invention*, Derrida means invention of itself, self-referential invention. Is not the son himself an invention of himself, and not an invention of the father? The son appears to be responding to the father's desire, but is he not actually putting himself into this gesture, without the father? The son as some otherness that cuts into this narcissistic desire of the father, even if he turns out to be so close to this desire that it even coincides with it.

This reading of Derrida's narrative framework of Cicero's treatise turns it into a kind of *allegory*, into an allegory of the problematic at the heart of the theme of invention. In practice, this is an allegorical addressing of the question of how talking about invention relates to an understanding of tradition, of continuity. It is a question of whether it is a question of continuity or, on the contrary, there is a discontinuity, there is an intrusion of something that is not inherent in that continuity, that transcends it. Is this continuity itself not conditioned and fundamentally displaced by some transcendent, beyond-to-it basis – the absolute invention, the irreducible beyond of the order of tradition itself. Moreover, Derrida, referring to the studies of Paul de Man, emphasizes the tension between reproducibility and novelty as defining the very figure of allegory, unfolding temporally in its narrative form some "eternal", atemporal truth.

We already see the framework of the questioning to which Derrida subjects invention: there is no invention without a single event, and for something to be a single event means that it is absolutely unique, unprecedented. The unprecedentedness of the new simultaneously confronts its own expectation, the demand for unprecedentedness. In the coming of the new (invention) its repeatability is inscribed. So it is in technique in the modern sense of the word, so it is with regard to poetry. Derrida points to genre forms as machines for literary invention: someone has written a particular work that implicitly contains within itself the norm for constructing other works of the same type, a norm that first appears with that text. However, in order to demonstrate such an entanglement between these two dimensions, namely a situation in which there are no guarantees for a secure distinction between constative and performative (and hence – the given and the new) in the relationship between an individual work and its genre affiliation, Derrida comments on the brief "Fable" by the French poet Francis Ponge, a text thematizing its own verbal construction.

From here, Derrida moves on to the historical process of establishing norms for recognition and acknowledgement of invention, i.e. to its historical "status". Emphasizing the etymology of the expression "status" itself, related to

the idea of standing, he derives invention in its dependence on previous conditions and materials as an exclusively human activity (in its difference with the Judeo-Christian idea of God's creation from "nothing"), i.e. as one of the key moments in the affirmation of a traditional humanistic metaphysics, which for Derrida continues in the contemporary talk about the need for invention in art and technology.

Derrida's attempt to say something new about invention and the newness that will be expressed in it is that, in fact, invention should be thought not as absolutely incompatible with creation, but precisely as an openness to that which surprises, regardless of all expectations. In this sense, the allegory of Cicero/Derrida is very revealing - the example of this son who has surpassed what was expected of him. And this anticipation is the unexpected, the severance of his response from any preparation, from foresight even in the sense of acknowledging the genealogy, the response as embedded in the expectation of the father. An interruption hidden behind this form of continuation, of an apparently father-dictated response of the son.

All of this is very much like the baroque form of religious experience in the temple, the amazement at the wonder of the presence of the Holy Spirit in its space. There are traces of it both in baroque poetics and in the understanding of surprise from the expected, which we commented on in Burke's sublime. The miracle for the believer as a believer is precisely some extraordinary breakthrough in the midst of expecting the extraordinary - although believers believe that a miracle will come, it must come suddenly to them. And in Derrida's allegory, the son responds to the father and his invention exactly as expected, i.e. the new here retains its undetermined newness even when there is no distinction between it and the conditions that try to predetermine it. However, this risks reducing the operations, the *techne* of invention, to its inscribing in a static picture of immanence as always a mere given, and the new to a beyond that suddenly merges with this ready-made given. The deconstructive re-invention of invention that Derrida undertakes undoubtedly attempts to destabilize precisely these stakes of the opposition between the immanent and the transcendent. The invention of deconstruction as preparation *without preparation* for the new, as letting the new happen without mastering it by the conditions that "give" it, allows the new to be thought not only as a transcendent breakthrough, but as (or at least also as) inner transformativeness and openness of the given itself to non-predetermination.

And this is precisely what Derrida does with the invention itself - he tries to encompass all its meanings and to say that even these meanings should not

exhaust what it should actually allow. We can say that for Derrida the new, and as the purely new - some radical singularity of the new, excluding conditions for its recognizability - in fact always necessarily remains beyond his invention itself. The invention is *incapable* of the new, because it is *another* new. Moreover, through its "status", through its identifiability, the invention risks even turning its back on the new, the right to which its very status, its identifiability, acknowledges for it. The new is not the subject of invention, it is not its derivative, in its appropriation it drops it, but at the same time it is not completely dropped, it is not completely leveled in recognizability, in the order of the same, but only when invention indicates its impossibility of the new in contrast with its own concept.

Derrida undoubtedly inscribes here the new in the very series of European ontotheology, from the reduction to which deconstruction tries to rescue the "entirely other." The difference between the new and the other in this text clearly turns out to be a matter of distinguishing between *unique irreducible singularity* and *repeatable irreducible singularity*.

But doesn't this giving due to "entirely other" still preserve too much transcendence? Doesn't the allegory of the father's surprise at the expected turn out to be too close to the baroque allegory of the astonishment of the miracle of faith we have suggested? And then do we not unfortunately find ourselves again in the domain of ontotheology after all? Perhaps we should make another revision of the invention, back to the new, but by equipping it with only immanent grounds for its repeatability?

### **Chapter 3. The Crisis of the New in the Dispute between T. Adorno and P. Bürger**

Commenting on Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*, another member of the Frankfurt School and avant-garde scholar, Peter Bürger, objects to Adorno's tendency to privilege the category of the new in avant-garde art forms. For Bürger, the new is essentially a market category. In the context of market relations, the new is not really new, but a packaging of the same, the old in new clothes. Always the same, always only goods. For Bürger, the new turns out to be a marker of commodification incompatible with the ambitions of the left avant-garde, which he tries to elucidate in his influential *Theory of the Avant-Garde*.

Of course, here he is not really far from the view of Adorno himself, for whom the market produces a crisis of the new in art. The latter also unfolds the idea of the market as a renewal of the same, as refreshing the same principles,

the same relations and dependencies, which are, of course, economic relations of exchange in society. However, as we shall see, Adorno insists on some essential role that the category of the new reserves for itself in the midst of its crisis even with the avant-garde.

The theorists associated with the Frankfurt School, who conceptualize the new in modernity through this logic of problematization, exposing it as some disguise of the same, as an effect of the market, are in fact undoubtedly posing the question of invention in fundamentally Marxist terms. In Adorno's sociological analysis, the dialectic driven by contradictions as a condition for change, in modern "exchange societies" has been brought to an absolute identity, to an (at least apparent) reconciliation of the conflicting poles, with which, however, it has blocked all change, development, transformation of social conditions. Adorno finds a conceptual counterpart to this reign of social statics in objective socioeconomic conditions in Hegel's dialectic model of identity, for whom only "the whole is true." The "whole" is precisely this absolute identity of opposites against which Adorno rebels. This also motivates his project of "negative dialectics" - a dialectic that holds contradictions to allow change to continue through them against its freezing in their identity.

Hence the Frankfurt School's famous criticism of the instrumentality of knowledge in modern science. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, one of the well-known books that Adorno wrote together with Max Horkheimer, the idea is systematically developed that the process of advance of modern science turns it from an instrument of domination over nature for the benefit of mankind, into a mechanism of social domination by knowledge, by concept. To the extent that nature is not an object separate from man, and to the extent that rational knowledge objectifies the human subject itself, man himself becomes the target of the domination promised in science. A process also related to the concept of ideology, which they borrow from Georg Lukács - the concept of "reification". Lukács brings this concept forward as an explanation of his own understanding of ideology as the dominance in the minds of social actors under capitalism of the commodity form itself over the relations between people. Making sense of these relations under the sign of the commodity form reifies them and involves them in relations of exchange. The Frankfurt theorists dialecticize Lukács' concept, insofar as for them reification is not only a one-way objectification of the subject, but is even above all a matter of fitting some reality to some concept of the subject. Their solution to countering this process is that the Enlightenment should itself be enlightened about its own mythic consolidation, the dialectic itself should dialecticize itself, and so preserve the possibility of development through contradiction, but so as to cut off its own tendency to



remove contradictions, and hence— qualifying any development into a standstill. An effort which, for Adorno, rests decisively on the question of the new in modern art.

The crisis of the new drives Adorno's critique of the functions and forms of the new in modern culture, which have their origins in the role of what he calls the "cultural industries" already clarified in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, i.e. the processes of unstopable flow of popular art production. Popular products for Adorno, of course, work with the pretense and strain of being new. But behind this modern dynamism, under the cover of change, stagnation deepens, dynamism imperceptibly turns out to be its very opposite.

This is the main theme of his last work - his famous *Aesthetic Theory*. Already in its first fragments, he introduces the problem of the crisis of the new as an effect of reification through the concept of the "abstract new": "The abstract new can stagnate, turn into always the same... The new intends to be the non-identical, but becomes identity". The unexpected solution that he envisages is in the direction of exactly what modern art seems to have completely abandoned: art manages to somehow give at least a utopian hope for such a rescue of the new by becoming a mimesis of the abstract new, i.e. becoming mimetic again in a very particular sense, which Adorno will henceforth try to construct. What is abandoned in modern art, and this abandonment stands out for Adorno above all in realism and naturalism, is the retreat from any idea of semblance that is at the core of the legacy of the notion of mimesis.

The question of the new for Adorno becomes a question of mimesis of the new. In turn, mimesis itself becomes a matter of expression. The linking of the theme of semblance with that of expression in Adorno's *Aesthetics* is a rather intricately convoluted move, because at least from the end of the 18th century, expression became the opposite of imitation as a definition of artistic forms. In imitation, the object is leading as the content of art, and in expression, the direction is from the subject to the work. With the introduction of the theme of reification into the problematic of expression, i.e. by emphasizing above all that expression objectifies the subject, Adorno attempts to undermine the implication of immediacy in the implications of the aesthetics of expression and restore the rights of appearance precisely in the problematic of truth.

In order to secure the relationship between mimesis and expression, Adorno returns to a specific moment in the history of modern aesthetics, distinguished as early as the 18th century, but completely abandoned later, especially in Hegel's aesthetics, which turned precisely the identification of the subject, of the spirit, with the forms of its expression in a decisive determination

for art - the naturally beautiful. For the Frankfurt theorist, the naturally beautiful reveals a nature that resists being reduced to objectification in modern science, insofar as beauty here can be thought of as a way for nature to express itself, a way to address us, a way, at least seemingly, to speak. Nature "seems" to speak, but does not speak clearly, does not speak through concepts, this expression of itself is insufficiently expressive, Adorno characterizes it as "silent". Hence the next point in his dialectic - the work of art turns out to be something that takes this expressiveness of nature and nature itself as a part of itself in order to make this appearance a reality. But only seemingly. This is its definiteness as mimesis. Appearance here turns out to maintain the very boundary between expression and the expressed, holding the contradiction in the midst of its removal.

Art, on its side (i.e. on the side of the subject) tries to give voice, says Adorno, to this voiceless expression of nature. But taking into itself this contradiction, this discrepancy between expression and what is expressed as semblance, art itself, as an expression of the very apparent expression of nature, cannot be anything other than semblance. Inscribing the contradiction within itself, expressing the contradiction in expression, it becomes an appearance of an appearance. Thus, the two moments of semblance unfold a further move in this dialectic: the semblance of nature taken in the form of a work, in its own semblance, as the task of removing the semblance of expression in nature. It is already semblance against semblance, the cancellation of semblance as semblance, the preservation of semblance in its very removal - semblance for the non-semblance of semblance.

The doubling in the dialectic of the semblance-expression relation itself has two moments - a moment of revealing the new as the non-identical, of semblance as the new, but together with this a critical moment - the exposure of semblance as semblance in the abstract new. First of all, a doubleness of illusion creeps in here, in which the illusion itself is no longer just an illusion, not just the opposite of reality, but a pledge to capture what remains inexpressible in all intelligibility and insight through a concept. This is exactly how the new enters, through this duality of semblance that is the work, in this interval between the apparent speaking of nature, in beauty as the illusion of some almost voiceless message to us, and the apparent completion of this voice of nature in the work. We can even assume that to some extent the appearance itself is the new, insofar as it is something "in addition". The beauty of nature is its appearance "in excess" of itself, this non-identity between truth and appearance, it is the complement of a "not yet" that the work of art takes into itself in its own beautiful form.

Thus Adorno tries to delineate this strange situatedness of the work, a straddling between its actual existence as something solidified and reified and the insertion of deactualization, of non-existence into its very objectification, into its reification. Yet in this way the work becomes able of disclosing the semblance at the very core of universal publicity carried into society through its cultural industries. Modernism and the avant-garde in art actually turn out to be a mimesis of the solidification and reification of the new in the market. "Mimesis" means for Adorno not simply a witnessing, not simply a showing that it is so (although this is also its role - to be an indication of such wearing out of the new, taking away into abstraction a real newness in the world). The modern determinacy of high art for Adorno here is a taking over of mimetic reification in a second mimetic order that lays it bare, and thus rescues the new from its desiccating ossification.

We have already mentioned that Peter Bürger denies the validity of thinking about the avant-garde in terms of novelty. According to him, the new, not only in modernity but also earlier, has always necessarily included some tendency towards reification. He suggests this through his example of the situation of the minstrel in the Renaissance - he comes to some ruler and says: "I have a new song." But there is nothing new here in the sense of the non-identical developed by Adorno. "A new song" is the new within very narrow limits, emphasizes Bürger, it is the new with regard to this genre, i.e. another song of this type. This is already the beginning of reification.

As we have seen, for Adorno the new becomes possible again beyond reification at the cost of doubling its totalization through the other totalization of the work in its autonomy. The failure of the very striving for autonomy as a failure for a complete and at the same time non-identical totalization makes the relation between the two totalities a relation between semblances, and at the same time creates the conditions for the exposure of semblance in the semblance through its doubling. But this "rescue of the new" is too vague for Bürger, since his analysis of the avant-garde lacks the conditions for this dialectic. According to him, the avant-garde not only renounces the new, compromised by commodification, it categorically opposes the very condition of the autonomy of art. In this sense, the avant-garde does not even try to make art, let alone give expression to the semblance in nature. Instead, it attempts to destroy art as an institution and collapse all of its historically accumulated forms back into the social world. The avant-garde organizes a space for the simultaneity of all the styles, techniques and concepts that have unfolded in the sequence of art history, and thus summarizes all art in order to completely

remove it. Not the new based on autonomy, but the dismantling of the very frames of autonomy of art is the aim of the avant-garde.

Bürger's critique of Adorno has indicative value for our attempt to restore some relevance to the concept of invention in the field of thinking about literature - in it, the loss of autonomy entails a complete discrediting of the new. Therefore, the preservation, the "rescue" of the new (and hence - something of invention, at least in its modern definition) really begins to look like a question related in some way to the question of autonomy. However, we should not forget the necessity, suggested by Adorno, to prevent a complete closure of autonomy - it becomes capable of novelty only if it is incomplete, only if it is also heteronomous. Undoubtedly, this insistence places the position of the German thinker very close to the aporias of invention already discussed in our commentary on Derrida.

#### **Chapter 4. Invention and the Imaginary: The Literary Anthropology of Wolfgang Iser**

Throughout the trajectory of his theoretical endeavors, the German literary scholar Wolfgang Iser consistently privileged the notion that the experience of literature is always an experience of new meaning. Beginning with his early preoccupations with the interaction between text and reader through its unfolding as a question of literary anthropology to his posthumously collected studies of literature as a process of emergence, the theme of the new remains an enduring stake in his work. The present commentary on his ideas will accordingly be guided mostly by correlating the problematic of literary invention with the anthropological functions that Iser ascribes to literature.

In *The Fictive and the Imaginary*, Iser states that although literature no longer fulfills a number of its traditional functions ("from entertainment to information"), its anthropological function remains undisturbed. The latter is interpreted as an operation to embody the infinite indeterminacy of human existence, its tendency to seek forms of self-representation and at the same time not to be reduced to these forms. The emphasis is placed precisely on what literature produces as an effect of change in its audience, on the way in which the literary text transcends its own boundaries while also transcending the boundaries of what we take for granted. Something is invented, it is created by the literary text, and through this invention something inaccessible finds a way to manifest itself.

Already in *The Act of Reading*, what for Iser ensures that the experience with the literary text is precisely a new experience, irreducible to the already

available attitudes and value prejudices of the reading subject, is the very indeterminacy in the fabric of the text, recognized by the reader only in the background of (and in contrast to) the determinisms of said attitudes and values. The difference between determinism and indeterminacy as the main operative mode of literature is also preserved in Iser's anthropological project, albeit with modifications, in the form of the real-fictitious-imaginary triad.

Iser's literary anthropology relies on a peculiar and paradoxical doubling. Literature both reveals man as capable of continually acquiring new forms of existence and is at the same time the agent forming this capacity for forms. Simultaneously passively revealing and actively formative, literature testifies to the fact that man is not some fixed once-for-all form of life, but is constantly remodeling and self-constructing. "Man" here is, as it were, the very predisposition to find new forms for oneself, with every culturally determined form being contingent and subject to change. The role of literature is to propose, to invent such forms and at the same time to transcend them, to overexpose their accidental character. Literature confronts established forms with new ones that are incompatible with them, but the new forms do not impose themselves as credible alternatives, but are themselves subject to vacillation through their relationship with established ones. They are "as if" the already there, but at the same time they are radically new and only acquire a certain definition through their analogy with the familiar. Accordingly, the old and the new are posited in terms of reversibility—as the newly derived forms are defined as deviating from the existing ones in order to take their place, the current forms may also have arisen in a similar way.

According to Iser, the anthropological work of literature is rooted in correlating the real and the imaginary through acts of fictionalization. The real-fictional-imaginary triad is proposed in order to undermine the categorical mutual exclusion between reality and fiction. The opposition between real and imaginary here is again that between determinacy and radical indeterminacy, deployed again as a relation between actuality and potentiality. Literature produces contact between the given and the potential for it to be other, thereby revealing the contingency of the conditions under which the given is "given." The thesis obviously boils down to the finding that the new does not arise in isolation and alongside the given (as a radical break), it is the very logic of the given in its tendency to change.

A careful look at the anthropological dimensions that Iser tries to outline shows that the understanding of man as the "fullness of his possibilities", of man as an indeterminate nature, goes hand in hand with the understanding of the

activation of this potential through contact with the empirical environment. Man does not self-impose forms consciously, his forms are imposed from the outside, filtering the possibilities, reducing and institutionalizing some under the condition of excluding others. In these frameworks, the "fullness of possibilities" - the imaginary - functions almost analogously to the unconscious in psychoanalysis. The imaginary is inaccessible to consciousness in its pure form—it can only be thought of as something other than what it is, in some determinate form that marks it with its own moments. The main difference here is the radical passivity of the imaginary – it is never the basis or source of action except as an interaction with its enabler.

Literature makes this transition from form to form, from an institutionalized role to a new, non-institutionalized one, without completing it, i.e. without the new form completely obliterating the old. It is precisely in this peculiarity of literature that Iser discovers its anthropological necessity. Constructing a new form with materials extracted by decomposing the old through two acts of fictionalization – of selection and combination, literature simultaneously cancels the thus formed as a full-fledged contender for a new reality in a third act – of fiction's self-disclosure. Because of its overtly fictional nature, the literary text produces something that remains without consequence. The anthropological function, available only to literature, according to Iser, consists precisely in the fact that the available ceases to be itself, begins to denote something else, something absent, while the absent is not equated with the present. In this way, literature brings to consciousness and knowledge the very inaccessibility and unknowability of the basis, of the generative process of cultural forms.

In arguing for the anthropological functionality of literary texts, it becomes apparent that Iser tries to motivate it through internal inadequacies in empirical experience itself. At the same time, he seeks to state that these deficiencies become accessible and perceptible only through the transposition of elements of empirical experience into literature. Only literature reveals the limitation, the partiality of the systems of the real. At the same time, this disclosure claims that boundaries are available prior to and independently of it. Here we can already feel a basic tension, the sharpness of which can become explicit if we ask whether literature reveals or, on the contrary, is in fact constructing these boundaries.

Iser himself introduces this understanding of his in a somewhat counterintuitive manner. If the imaginary is invention itself, at the same time it actually creates nothing, invents nothing. Its productivity is not its own, but the

work of its intermediary (medium) – the fictive and its three acts. But the fictive alone is also not productive. In a long footnote Iser tries to clarify this question from its reverse side, viz. starting from fiction. Commenting on the already discussed views of Sir Philip Sidney as a model for making sense of the relationships in his conceptual triad, Iser attributes to the poet a compensatory function. The available is transcended – that is fiction. The available has been adjusted i.e. it is renewed, we have the new available in relation to the old – that is invention. Of course, Iser is keen to emphasize that in such coordination of fiction and invention, the correction is never complete. For him, the fictive tempts the imaginary to forms. However, this does not mean that the fictive gives it its form. Rather, the imaginary only takes shape, prompted by the negativity of the fictive, without canceling it. Invention produces, and fiction surrounds it with a double negativity - the old available is de-actualized, and the new available is previously "always already" canceled. Moreover - the double negativity of fiction is redoubled by the double positivity of the imaginary - it not only produces the forms subject to cancellation by fiction (through "self-disclosure") but also retains the form transcended by fiction (as that which is transcended, as the de-actualized in its specifics). Thus, actualizing something as its target, the intentional structure of the fictive actualizes the imaginary paradoxically precisely as non-actual, i.e. keeps it from completely matching the real.

Iser's model of the work of literature presented so far has its epistemological foundations in general systems theory, with the most frequent references being to Niklas Luhmann. According to Luhmann, social systems (including art), as well as living and mental systems (each of which has its own specificity) are autopoietic, i.e. proceeding through recursive self-development. Moreover, in their continuous autopoiesis, they are operatively closed. For Luhmann, any autopoietic system arises from the production of difference in an unmarked (ie undefined and unsegmented, disorganized) space. The system creates itself in a radically arbitrary, externally unmotivated act of self-distinction against the environment, which is constituted as the environment of the system by the system itself in the act of its differentiation. This is exactly what the term "operational closure" means - the system is the very difference between the system and the environment specifically selected by the system through the difference. In the system itself, the arbitrariness of the difference that draws its boundaries and creates through these boundaries its corresponding environment where before there was only pure potentiality, is masked as observation. The operations of the system are observed, but observation itself is one of these operations, and it is exactly that operation by which the system

maintains its constitutive difference with its environment. One observes the environment, but actually reproduces the system as a difference between system and environment. In short, observation produces what it observes. Social systems are functionally differentiated, but the concept of function here is not tied to anthropological emphases – the function is reducible to the specific way of managing meaning in different systems in view of the specific way in which the distinction between system and environment is enforced in the respective system.

The proposed clarification of Luhmann's conceptual apparatus can serve us to recognize certain areas of tension in the theoretical construction of the *Fictive and Imaginary*. The heuristic reconstruction of Iser's theoretical model proposed here in terms of Luhmann's systems theory allows us to see precisely one unnoticed paradox: the maintenance of the difference between real and imaginary in the operations of the fictive is supported by validity criteria subordinated to the logic of the fictive itself. The paradox here is that if we are to characterize the operations of the fictive in terms of operational closure, it turns out that the real is an indeterminate environment, and the deterministic other side of the system turns out to be the imaginary (even though its determinations are presumptively negative). It is not by chance that the mode of functioning of the literary text in relation to reality is described by Iser precisely as "insertion". This "insertion" seems to contradict the principal action of the fictional selection, which is rather an extraction of elements of the systems of the real from their usual context. However, this contradiction is only apparent – the very difference between real and imaginary is inserted into reality through the operations that Iser calls fictionalizing acts. The immediate consequence of producing such a difference is the transformation of reality into the 'real', into a surrounding environment, into a passive and diffuse reserve of materials subject to extraction in order to determine the imaginary. The elements of real systems are not observable "in themselves", outside of the operation that selects them and implements certain functions, in this case the function to denote. In other words, through the operations of the fictive, the real is reduced simply to a potentiality of forms for determining the imaginary, it is the very process of imposing the form of the real on the imaginary. Accordingly, it is not the selection that turns out to be observation, but rather the opposite – the observability of the elements is produced precisely in the process of arbitrary selection, the justification of which has yet to occur with the imposed determinacy of the imaginary. As for combinations, the semantic destabilizations that accompany this process depend on a boundary strictly internal to this process itself. Iser insists that the crossing of boundaries is in the



direction of transcending denotation. However, it is obvious that polysemy and figurativeness are not semantic phenomena exclusively characterizing literary texts. Rather, the fictionalizing operation artificially produces a rigid distinction between literal and figurative to serve the interests of the figurative side in this regard. Here, the fictive crossing of the border takes place with the parallel arbitrary delineation of this border. This is also true of the act of self-disclosure of fiction. The imaginary world of literary works is forced to both compare and differentiate itself from the world of reality. The act of self-disclosure actually refers to the product of the synthesis of the previous two operations – the world in the text. Insofar as it is revealed in its own unreality, here the imaginary refers to the real in order to guarantee its departure from it. But insofar as it has become accessible only in the form of the real, as its doubling, the literary text has no other option than to present the real as subject to an analogical mechanism.

It turns out that, in fact, literature is constantly drawing newer and newer boundaries in order to cross them. But these boundaries are apparently its constructs. But does this not mean that the literary text is autopoietic quite literally, does it not create itself by drawing the line between its own creations and the "real" to which it refers, constructing it as a contrasting background for self-determination?

Perhaps, then, the question of the invention inherent in literature should be transferred to the territory that Iser leaves behind - perhaps it should be sought precisely in the field of a consideration of literary pragmatics and semantics that advocates literary autonomy without ascribing to it an anthropological pragmatization, a consideration that returns to the traditional correlation of invention and fiction as the relation of act to product. An attempt at such a description of invention and its products seems to be offered by theorists of fictional worlds.

### **Chapter 5. The Theory of Fictional Worlds as a Theory of Literary Invention: Lubomír Doležel**

One of the most recent and influential theories advocating an explicitly anti-mimetic claim about fiction is the theory of "fictional worlds" developed by scholars such as Lubomír Doležel and Tomas Pavel in the 1980s and 1990s as adapted to the study of literature. a variant of the logical semantics of possible worlds developed by analytic philosophers such as Saul Kripke and David Lewis in the 1960s.

Here we will focus on the framework proposed by Lubomír Doležel in his seminal monograph *Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds*, as it clearly asserts itself as a theory of literary invention, even though it is limited to narrative literature. For him, the question of literary invention is answered in the understanding of the specificity of its products - fictions, or rather fictional worlds.

Although the discourse of possible worlds has its starting point in Leibniz, the version of it invoked by theorists such as Doležel is related to the way in which the American philosopher Saul Kripke turns to Leibniz's notion to systematically clarify modal categories (or more precisely alethic modalities) in logical semantics: possibility, necessity, contingency and impossibility. This type of possible-worlds reasoning has also become a way of developing logical semantics since the 1960s in another direction—for some researchers, it offers a consistent way of distinguishing intensionality from extensionality in expressions. Here we can simplistically represent the aspirations of this semantics as follows: we start with a language and the set of possible worlds, and intensionality is the rule for associating the utterances of the language with some subset of possible worlds. The general semantic mode of using the notion of possible worlds promises logical semantics a reduction of the ambiguities in the applicability of truth criteria in the logical analysis of language, but in turn gives rise to a new ambiguity, since the semantic problems that are solved by it do not clarify the question of the ontological commitments of the possible worlds discourse. In this context, one of the more contested positions is the idea of actuality as indexicality, presented by David Lewis. According to him, the actual world is simply the world in which the expression observed in the analysis was produced. Others (among them Stalnaker, Plantinga, and Creswell) argue that there are possible worlds, but only one of them happens to be actual—our world. They generally agree with Kripke's insistence that "possible worlds are stipulated, not discoverable with powerful telescopes." Thus, "possible worlds" are often considered purely linguistic constructs with logical but not ontological significance.

The debates in analytic philosophy surrounding the notion of possible worlds, which are summarized very schematically here, are further complicated by the insistence of some literary theorists such as Doležel on the usefulness of possible worlds theory in defining literary fiction, but only on the condition of distinguishing between possible and properly fictional worlds. In *Heterocosmica*, Doležel defends recourse to the possible-worlds model as the basis of his critique of previous "one-world" models for describing fictional texts. The first target of his criticisms are theories such as Frege's and

structuralism, which introduce a difference in language itself - splitting it into non-literary (referential) and poetic (auto-referential). The more substantial part of Doležel's critique is aimed at the theories that have claimed to provide literature with some kind of referentiality: mimetic theories. Doležel's main objection is that mimetic models never allow the reference of the literary text to be fictional particulars. Since, according to these positions, the domain of literary discourse is the actual world, the focus of all literary utterances is either actual particulars (the claim that for every character, event, or being in a literary work there necessarily exists an actual prototype), or instead of particulars, literary texts refer to universals (which is the legacy of the Aristotelian model in thinking of mimesis as imitation always of something general). It is important to note that, in addition to these possibilities of mimetic theory, Doležel also discovers a third one that is somewhat unusual - the critical discourse in which fictional particulars are preserved, but they are presented as existing before their "creation" by the literary text in some undefined ontological realm where they readily await the literary author to find and describe them.

Doležel presents the need to resort to the notions of the theory of possible worlds as an attempt to provide a referent for fictional texts - a fictional world for any literary text that is radically separated from the actual world. The last point is of particular importance because, according to Doležel, everything that crosses the border isolating fiction from the actual world, everything that passes from actual existence and passes into reference to the fictional text, changes its ontological status. The fictional world is ontologically homogeneous, everything in it is fictional, none of its elements are actual, even when they appear so.

Along with classical semantic theories of fiction, Doležel also criticizes pragmatic theories. In line with his insistence on constructivism, he argues that the prevailing pragmatic theories of fiction, which present a notion of pretense in literary speech acts, are inadequate, and insists that the literary author does not pretend, but actually does something—creates something that is not current. His main complaint about pragmatic approaches in describing aesthetic activities, however, boils down to the existing need for truth in the definition of artistic prose. The statements of the literary author in the process of their formulation cannot be addressed from the point of view of their truth, but after the artistic world has been established through the "texture" of his work, questions of truth again become valid. Writing is an act of invention, while it creates something, but what it creates becomes completely fixed in immutability.

For Doležel, the fictional world of literary narratives is a semiotic construct resulting from performative speech acts with a specific illocutionary force, whose two aspects - authentication and saturation - function as the intension of the text. This coincidence of intensionality and pragmatics, the reduction of a text's intensionality to its world-building operation, ultimately fits the way intensionality is conceived of in the formal semantics of possible worlds. The fictional world is a correlate of the performative power of the literary text, it is a perlocutionary effect, and only the specific "structure" of the work gives it its enduring individuality.

It seems that for Doležel the actual world is something quite stable and homogeneous. This impression arises from the way in which his theoretical construction presents heterogeneity as a distinctive feature of the construction of fictional worlds. In line with Leibniz, Doležel insists that the worlds must conform to the rules of compatibility for the entities that inhabit them. That is why he talks about macrostructural constraints imposed on worlds—general rules that determine what kind of particular objects can be assumed to appear in a particular fictional world. The heterogeneity of fictional worlds stems from the fact that conflicting macrostructural constraints may be applied to their creation, i.e. they can be set as compatibility of incompatibility.

We must emphasize that the insistence on contradictory macrostructural conditions for the fictional world is another move in Doležel's theory designed to avoid the risk that the theory of fiction developed here will turn out to be some variant of mimetic theory. But in fact, the real risk arises from the direction in which he seeks a solution to the problem of the specificity of the fictional world itself among other kinds of possible worlds—its incompleteness. According to Doležel, the main feature of fictional worlds is their incompleteness, their components have only those characteristics attributed to them by the text and no others. The object in the fictional world is a concrete set of definitions that the text gives it and an indeterminacy of properties about which the text is silent. We must immediately emphasize that this incompleteness, which spreads over the entire fictional world, brings Doležel's project very close to the classical Platonic version of mimesis. For Plato, mimetic copies are defined precisely by lack, by incompleteness. Their existence is defined as participation in the Idea, i.e. they do not fully match it, hence they are thought of as likenesses. They only exist to a certain extent. In fact, Doležel describes fictional beings in the same way that Plato defines poetic imitation—as having a degree of existence, of reality, as a function of distance from a fully determinate and real original.

This entanglement of his theory with the legacy of mimesis, which ultimately undermines the intention with which Doležel presents his discourse on fictional worlds, necessarily forces another question to his theoretical model: whether the construction of the world, which he identifies as the main inventive force of literature, means more than simply opening up actuality to some kind of pure transcendence that takes us further away from the real?

### **Chapter 6. Invention and Metaphor: Paul Ricoeur**

Here we will return to the topic of invention in the form in which it was given in the baroque concepts of the late 16th and early 17th centuries as a key moment in which a peculiar new interweaving of concepts takes place around the very category of invention and the place of their focus in metaphor. For this purpose, we will refer to Paul Ricoeur's book *The Living Metaphor*, since Ricoeur's concept of metaphor is in fact a concept of how invention takes place, and the very notion of invention is closely related to what Ricoeur calls a living metaphor: the metaphor as an invention, in French *métaphored'invention*, literally "metaphor of invention" or "metaphor of invention", a term he takes from the classical rhetoric of Fontanier, where its use is in the sense of an inventive metaphor. Along the theme of metaphor, Ricoeur tries to develop a more comprehensive concept of how new meanings and referents can emerge, and through the question of this emergence he links, but also differentiates in a certain way, poetry and philosophy. Ricoeur considers metaphor in a specific sequence – metaphor as a problem of rhetoric, then as a problem of semantics, and finally as a problem of hermeneutics. And this movement from rhetoric through semantics to hermeneutics also describes, according to him, another movement, namely a continuous growth of the inventiveness of metaphor, which moves from the level of the word in rhetoric, to the level of the sentence in semantics, to the level of discourse (and the poetic work) or the hermeneutic level.

Ricoeur's thesis is developed on the basis of his reading of Aristotle, in whom, according to him, there are moments that condemn the meaning of metaphor to a certain misleading direction (towards substitution), but at the same time there are other moments that move it in a completely different direction (towards semantic innovation). What Ricoeur finds problematic in Aristotle's understanding of metaphor is, first of all, its reduction to the level of the word, and from there - its condemnation to understanding through the idea of substitution, maintained in the subsequent tradition and reaffirmed in modern semiotics. Ricoeur's disagreement can be boiled down to the fact that if metaphor is a substitution, i.e. is something ornamental, and can easily be

replaced by a proper word that expresses the same meaning in a proper way, it gives us nothing but some external detail, viz. it being a matter of inventing new meaning. Instead, he seeks to connect metaphor with Gilbert Ryle's notion of "categorical error", inasmuch as, with Aristotle, its rootedness in the idea of similitude places it both as species (metaphor by analogy) and genus (its other varieties as transfers from species to genus, from genus to species and from species to species as themselves implying similarity between genus and species). From here he draws in his understanding of metaphor upon the semantic notion of impertinent predication developed by the French theorist Jean Cohen (a notion, already recognizable indirectly, according to Ricoeur, in the work of English-language metaphor theorists such as Ivor Richards, Max Black, and Munroe Beardsley). Ricoeur is keen to emphasize that for Cohen this means that metaphor, insofar as it is an impertinent use, exerts pressure in the direction of recoding the code itself, the very paradigm of language. Metaphor exerts pressure on the very categorical dimensions of language.

Insofar as this "disassembly" of linguistic semantics takes the form of a transition from an established denotation to a new connotation not yet provided by language, and for Ricoeur connotation is usually associated with the idea that language becomes impenetrable, closed in its self-referentiality, he allows another bifurcation of meaning in the construction of metaphors - the connotation is actually a new reference, i.e. reference as something that has not been presupposed as reference in the possibilities of language itself up to this point. In this regard, Ricoeur speaks of metaphor as driving a 'split reference' - as an assertion that something 'is and is not', the formula of what Ricoeur calls 'metaphorical truth'.

Ultimately, Ricoeur would derive these aspects of metaphor as general features of poetic discourse: poetry is embedded in the metaphorical condition, it unfolds the possibilities of metaphor. As we have seen, already in his commentary on Aristotle Ricoeur emphasizes that metaphor succeeds in working at a higher transcendental level in relation to the semantic mechanisms in language due to the unfolding of similarity, of resemblance, beyond one of the types of metaphor, as something that can cover all its forms, namely, that it is a likeness that brings together what is distant. Resemblance for Ricoeur is not external to the idea of proximity, which at first sight is more closely related to metonymy. That is why Ricoeur manages to save the similarity as the essential point of the metaphor.

Ricoeur's study eventually unfolds as an attempt to separate from each other, but at the same time to somewhat bind, the semantic spheres of two types

of speech - poetic speech (where all the innovation and inventiveness of metaphor takes place) and speculative discourse. In practice, the question is how to distinguish between poetry and philosophy. Ricoeur insists on their strict distinctness. The realm of metaphor is the realm of poetry, showing us something like an epistemology of metaphor, which is not, however, the cognitive logic of science working in the established categories, in the established relations between genus and species. Metaphor, and hence poetry, works, relatively speaking, before the establishment of generic-species dependencies. It is the mechanism for the initial positing of the relation of genus and species, of the priming and subsequent modification of distinct discursive fields and categorical distinctions. The very constitution of language is already metaphorical in the sense that the primordial positing of the relation of genus and species is already something of a new relevance, without precedent. This determination of his is a primary move of unification in the identity of difference. The movement from old to new meaning in metaphor meets the transition from potentiality to actuality in the world, admitting the latter within the former. As far as philosophy is concerned, it ties this constitution of language to its very being. Philosophical reflection, stepping on the poetic metaphor, conceptualizes the actualizing potential of the world in its openness as a new referent, signified in language through the metaphorical opening of the references established in its already constituted semantic conditions to this process of emergence. Undoubtedly Ricoeur in his talk of metaphor wants to break with the idea that poetic language is self-referential, that it denotes only itself, that it has no semantic application beyond itself as a world. At the same time, he wants to preserve the self-referentiality of language itself for philosophical reflection as a reflection of language on its own being.

It is here that Ricoeur sees the divergence between metaphor and concept: metaphor inscribes the process of being in language and thus enables and compels philosophical discourse to assume the role of witnessing and reflexively confirming this dynamic in the concept constructed for it. The concrete opening to a new referent in the metaphor turns out to be accompanied by the abstract opening of the philosophical discourse to a new meaning in interpretation. It is not by chance that in this connection, towards the end of his study, he directly addresses the semantics of the concept of invention: "In short, we must restore the very split meaning of the nice word "inventing" (*inventer*), which implies both discovering and creating." However, we cannot help but notice that this restoration distributes the meaning of finding on both sides of Ricoeur's impassable border between poetry and philosophy. Poetic discourse becomes thinkable as anticipating and participating in being as an act, and

accordingly its metaphorical truth has an ontological stake, while the philosophical concept only epistemologically attests to its creative process.

The understanding of this complete rupture and bifurcation between philosophy and poetry can be disputed. Reasonable questions arise here, such as: does the self-designation of a text as poetic make it part of the poetic discourse? Moreover, if self-signification makes poetry *poetry*, does this not undermine Ricoeur's understanding of metaphor as the transformation of self-referentiality into a new heteroreferentiality? Isn't turning poetry into extended metaphor in fact metaphor without poetry? Here Ricoeur tries to defend speculativeness against all the accusations against it associated with a certain philosophical tradition that tries to eliminate all speculation and to retain only conventional referentiality in the form in which it exists as a scientific discourse on the given, recognized as the only possibility of truth at the level of language. The French thinker here seems to appeal to poetry to tell philosophy how to defend itself. Poetry is there to say how philosophy can speculate, however, beyond simply rehashing ready-made references as science does. After poetry makes new references, it turns out to be only an occasion for reflection, it sets the condition for reflection open to the new. But is similarity the real basis of invention? Does it not presuppose the primacy of the differences that similarity collects in its dialectic between difference and identity? This is a possibility that our study will follow in its final chapters.

### **Chapter 7. Invention and Memory: Henri Bergson**

Before continuing with Ricoeur's theme of similarity and difference, we will move onto the ideas of the philosopher Henri Bergson, one of the inspirations of quite a few modern theories focusing on the problem of the new.

To begin with, we will allow ourselves a quote from his "Creative Evolution", which can serve as a preface to the entire Bergsonian theory: "The universe endures. The more we study the nature of time, the more we will understand that duration means invention [*invention*], the creation of forms, the continuous unfolding of the absolutely new." Here already we may notice a certain synonymy: duration, invention, creation of forms, the absolutely new, continuity. But what does duration mean? Here the concept is applied to the Universe itself, creative evolution is the duration of life itself in evolution as a differentiation of different forms, and this is clearly an ontological process for Bergson. Initially, however, duration is only a concept that should describe the specificity of psychological experience, of the order of experiences of consciousness. The title of his first work, *Essay on the Immediate Givens of Consciousness* refers to this feature of the way in which subjective experience is



constructed - as an experience, intrinsically woven into a temporal process. The main charge against the sciences, which Bergson will try to make critically in this book, is that they approach being, objects in general, from a wrong premise - from their determination solely and exclusively on the basis of space. And space for Bergson is a homogeneity, an infinite divisibility into discrete units according to a measure common to them, and the elements that we separate and unite in this way remain the same, essentially unchanged in their nature as an effect of the properties of space as the ground of these operations.

The described conditions of scientific knowledge rely for their cognitive operations on what Bergson himself would most often call "intellect". Intellect is a faculty of the subject that is actually entirely at the service of the body, of corporeality, rather than what, according to Bergson, is more essential and more defining for us as thinking, spiritual, conscious individuals. The intellect reduces everything it encounters to what is most interesting to us, subjects objects entirely to our needs.

However, in the immediacy of experience, objects lose their reducibility to the utilitarian, for us they constantly reveal their unexpected, meaningless characteristics, i.e. they reveal their own heterogeneity in our immediate experience of them. In his early "Essay" Bergson draws a distinction, fundamental to his thought, between two types of multiplicities - quantitative ("distinct") and qualitative ("indiscernible"), the former resting on the latter. According to Deleuze, one of the most characteristic operations in Bergson's thinking is related to the opposition between differences of degree and differences of nature. The former is a relative difference, while the latter is a fundamental one. Bergson typically tries to demonstrate that behind the appearance of a difference in degree there is a difference in nature. This is true of both kinds of multiplicities—while positive science sees the difference between them as a difference of degree, he tries to affirm their difference in nature. Science, with its derivation of some model of intellectual reduction to distinctive features of objects on the basis of a general measure of uniformity, which necessitates their simplification, reduces qualitative multiplicities to quantitative ones. On the contrary, for Bergson in immediate experience we experience above all qualitative changes. What characterizes duration are precisely the two concepts at the basis of qualitative multiplicity – continuity and heterogeneity, continuity of heterogeneity.

We have outlined these frameworks of Bergson's ideas as an approach to the question developed in one of his notable works, *Matter and Memory*. Here he attempts to conceptualize an essential difference between the concepts of the

title. Matter is on the side of objects, of objectivity, on the side of space and intellect. There, what is dominant is action, movement. Bergson tries to go beyond the traditional formulation of the question of what is primary—whether thinking with its representations is primary, or whether matter is primary by giving rise to mental representations of itself. Bergson's effort is to reject both positions, proposing instead to think of matter itself as already pregnant with germs of representations, i.e. as a collection of *images*. According to him, matter in itself can be characterized as an image insofar as it is a pure surface, a pure display of itself, without hidden depths. Moreover, in this being of an image, things already show what they are in themselves. An image is something that is about to become representation, but a fullrepresentation is already the work of the intellect, aimed at reducing the image of matter to certain things in it that we need. For Bergson, these images, which the image transforms, are fundamentally movement. Everything material, including our organs in our bodies, our brain, etc., is image-movement. The very irritation, the very contact with a material object is already an image that is transmitted to our nerve ending, which is also an image, an image of the action coming from outside, only in the direction of its continuation. These nerve endings of ours get tangled up in our brain, which decides where to proceed with this action we have received. The brain, itself also an image, is the key link in this process of unfolding, for by halting the continuation of action momentarily, it provides a set of different possibilities for that continuation. There are many paths of continuation, and the brain only makes this interval in which possibilities accumulate.

In this interval something absolutely different will be cut in, which has nothing to do with movement and nothing to do with matter. This is the other term from the title of the book - memory. Memory will participate in where this movement will go, it will cut in there, in that interval before the reaction. For Bergson, memory is not in the brain, for the brain is matter, it works according to the same logic, on the plane of the other images-movements, while memory differs in nature from it.

True memory for Bergson is a remembrance. Remembering is a reference to a lived and, accordingly, an irrelevant, detached from the action, experience. This memory has nothing to do with images, materiality and movement. It has nothing to do even with actuality itself. Memory is completely virtual, unconscious, and in a completely different ontological register. It is, of course, duration, inasmuch as the very interval opened by the brain for the actualization of the memory takes time, as it is a delay in the continuation of a received action into a reaction. It is a continuous continuity of everything that happens, it

is a continuous growth of a huge baggage of our past that interacts with matter, with that interval of it opened by the brain. This entirely virtual dimension can still interact with the material images as it moves from its virtuality to its actualization and attaches itself to the action.

What is this memory? Memory is something meaningful, not mechanical. Unlike habit, which is an image of repeated motor actions deployed without interval, the past in memory is not a former present. For Bergson, memory is not what used to be present and is no longer. But what is it then? The past is real here and now, in the present, and even underlies a specific aspect of the present. Later, it was Gilles Deleuze, this defender of Bergson, who would best explain the role of this past, which is contemporary and simultaneous to the present itself, which is real in the midst of and cuts into the present (and is therefore not a present which just isn't anymore). This is the condition on the basis of which the present itself passes away and the next present occurs. This is the condition for there to be a flow of time at all, and hence it is the condition of duration itself. The past of memory is not of the order of the present, because the present is action. The condition of its passing away is that there is something accompanying it, and that is the whole, the total past of memory, which fully accompanies every present. And this means that the past is synchronous with every present, it does not pass, but the present is what passes into it. The past is whole because it is permanent, it lasts, it preserves, it preserves itself. It needs no support but itself, its preservation is in itself. Here we can find a decisive step in Bergson's thinking beyond the limits of the human subject and consciousness. The past is unconscious. However, unconscious not in the sense of something that works secretly and behind consciousness, it is simply *not conscious*.

And as it *is*, the past *does not act*. It is a reserve of elements that can themselves be activated when called upon by the present action, can be embedded in it in the form of a memory, which in this transition beyond virtuality itself already begins to acquire features of actuality. Memories are updated by the needs of the body's motor actions, they themselves become memory-images, and this is their actualization.

The whole of the past, as we have already said, is contained only in itself. Moreover, it is contained as different degrees of its own concentration, the whole of the past being wholly in each of its degrees. In describing memory, Bergson uses a rather strange image, that of an inverted cone that is cut into a plane. The plane is the present, the cone is memory, and naturally they intersect at a point. There are two perspectives –of the plane and of the cone - and this

point of intersection is the point of the present moment. From the perspective of the present, that point has already been displaced by the ongoing motion unfolding along the plane. From the point of view of memory, the point on the plane is the most condensed form of memory, the entire past in its most concentrated form. All the heterogeneity of all that has been experienced along with the present moment.

Here, however, another clarification is necessary: each subsequent moment is added to the collected together elements of the whole past at the point of its concentration and to the more rarefied sections of the cone at its depth, each of which is again the whole past in which also the new moment infuses itself. Each new present merges with the elements that make up this cone of the past, each subsequent new moment that we experience fundamentally changes the entire structure of the past, each new present is a change not only of and in the present, but also a change of the entire past. This double changeability, this aspect of change along the horizontal of the present and along the vertical of memory, is time itself, the very meaning of invention in Bergson as the principle of always only the new.

In *Matter and Memory* he insists that his study represents a form of dualism and is even an attempt to rehabilitate dualism. In the end, it will turn out that this dualism tends towards monism, towards tying in a knot the things that are separated by nature. Gradually he will begin to think of these differences as two sides of the same coin - being and action, virtuality and actuality. As Deleuze emphasizes, for Bergson these are two sides of the absolute itself. This very moment will be developed in "Creative Evolution", where along with the change of actual material bodies in the evolutionary process, he begins to outline the figure of a growing accumulation, of layers in a conditionally ontological memory of the world. Duration as change (present) is paired with duration as persistence (memory) so that duration itself becomes persistence of change each time. The evolutionary logic of this continuity of invention is driven by the particular causality of what Bergson calls *élan vital*. In "Creative Evolution" for Bergson, all durations are ultimately embedded in that of the life process as a whole, which, precisely as a duration, inscribing an ever-increasing dimension of virtual memory of the world, becomes creative, inventive. The notion of "life impulse" was actually his attempt to deal with the determinism in the evolutionary ideas of his time, which he addressed in two forms - the mechanicism of the neo-Darwinists and the finalism of the neo-Lamarckians. Bergson's objection to both approaches is that they do not allow for un presupposed novelty in evolution, since they conceive of it as a linear process driven either by mechanistic efficient causes or by the assumed goal of

the improving functioning of the biological organism. Instead of these two alternatives, he proposes a concept of parallel evolutionary threads unfolding as multiple and always incomplete solutions to a common task - the problem of sustaining and enhancing life in its heterogeneous diversity and changeability.

We must, however, recognize the sneaking of a particular problem at the heart of Bergson's transition from psychology to ontology, made between *Matter and Memory* and *Creative Evolution*, viz. in the transition from duration as an experience to duration as an ontological process of irreversible becoming of the always new – the problem of death. This problem can be somewhat simplistically described as follows: the individual duration of experience in and as a subject is radically interrupted, death is not experienced, it is an interruption, but not in the form of continuous interruption as duration itself, but as an interruption of duration. But in the vitalist theory of evolution developed by him, this moment of radical discontinuity disappears, life continues to assert itself and even accelerates this affirmation despite and even through the death of living organisms.

The duration of life includes within itself the destruction of the distinct durations to which it gives life. Duration versus duration. May we not, then, suppose some difference in nature between the duration of experience and the duration of life as a self-renewing *élan vital*? Bergson describes the possibility of embedding some durations in others, of inscribing some times in others, but must we not admit that the duration of the evolution of life itself is not organized in the same way that individual durations that it embraces are organized (as novelty through memory), precisely because of its already noted immortality?

## **Chapter 8. Difference and Invention: Between Gilles Deleuze and Gilbert Simondon**

In this final chapter, we will try to weave together the two central threads, actually assumed already in the observations made at the beginning of our study: the relation of the problematic of invention, in its straddling between the given and the new, to that of mimesis and fiction in their own duality of reproduction and illusion. We will do this by discussing these threads as they have been developed by two French successors to Bergson, both philosophers of the new. Gilles Deleuze and Gilbert Simondon developed, each in their own way, a processual philosophy of the emergence of the new with an emphasis on a shared critique of the reduction of this process in the notion of reality as an actual given. Both, following Bergson, insist that the production of newness does not exhaust itself, does not end, but continues to work through the fully

constituted subjects and objects in its process that we find framing experience. For example, Simondon insists that the individual is merely a phase in the process of his individuation, set in motion in a pre-individual material field, a phase at that which does not exhaust individuation—and after its emergence, the individual does not cease to individuate, becomes a body, becomes a subject, becomes a collective. For Deleuze, this process of individuation from the pre-individual is provided with the additional moment of actualization of virtual structures, directing the change of the material field, saturated with intense differences to non-presupposed forms of extensive existence. For him, it is a process of differenc/ation (of differentiation in the virtual and its actualization as differentiation) of Simondon's pre-individual field, understood as a field of only pure differences of intensity in matter. It is a process of emergence as the productivity of difference in referring differences only to differences, i.e. always without completion in identity or more precisely as a process that posits the actual being as locked in some self-identity as an illusion. One of the ways in which he tries to systematically develop this idea is through a reversal of the meaning of the concept of mimesis in Plato into the reproduction of difference only. Insofar as Plato's understanding of mimesis is decisively inscribed in the history of thinking about literature, the literary problematic will inevitably acquire a special role in and for the ideas of Deleuze himself, a problematic which, it seems to us, has not been adequately clarified in the writing on his project so far. However, Deleuze does not develop the concept of invention, instead emphasizing the concept of creativity, which becomes the preferred way of defining the inferences in his theory, a comprehensive ontological process of guaranteeing the new as the only reality. Instead, Simondon developed his notion of individuation as a theory of invention in technique. Unfortunately, he has a too limited treatment of the subject of invention in literature and/or art, and in a too reductive form, which seems to forget that art is also genealogically related to the concept of technique. Thus, for us, the approaches of the two philosophers appear to be necessarily complementary. In the present exposition, the attention devoted to Deleuze will predominate, since fortunately he almost completely integrates the foundations of Simondon's theory of invention into his ideas about the production of the new.

Deleuze constructs a picture of the genesis of experience as "heterogenesis", i.e. genesis through the distinction of two dissimilar types of genesis – *static genesis* as a movement of actualization of the virtual as a transcendental condition and *dynamic genesis* (it is here that Deleuze assigns a place to the ideas of individuation that he borrows from Simondon) in the actual itself. Static genesis is itself double because of the difference between the

*virtual* and its *actualization* (the virtual as differentiated is grasped in a fashion, close to the differential structures of the structuralists, its actualization is differentiation). But the dynamic genesis in the actual is also twofold. Its difference is framed as a difference between *extensiveness* and its producing *intensity*.

For Deleuze, all this is simultaneously a constitution of time. In the passive synthesis of habit (the organization of a nexus of uniform repetition of an over-and-over "happening" present amidst the heterogeneity in that happening) the rudiments of the subject (Deleuze speaks of "larval subjects") are formed as contemplative grasps of the repetition that sustain it in the face of the risk of disintegration in the heterogeneity in the midst of which it is synthesized. This foundation of time also necessitates the acquisition of a foundation. The basis of the present is the past, understood almost identically to the "pure past" as virtual memory in Bergson. Habit is the repetition of the present, each time a present, but for the present to be such a repetition of its moments, each of them must give way to the next. The present passes into the past, which also here, as with Bergson, accompanies the present. In the perspective of the past, the present is again only the most concentrated point of the past itself.

And the future? The future is the new. Put somewhat simply, the future, through reference to Nietzsche's eternal return, is the re-inscribing each time of the difference between past and present, between the actual and the virtual. This incessant persistence of difference (and it is precisely difference which always ensures the new for Deleuze) protects against the identification of the virtual and the actual side of the process, it is the "ungrounding" of the basis and the grounding, the incommensurability between virtuality and actuality. Deleuze emphasizes that the future is the moment when time becomes pure form, breaking away from its determinability through movement. The future makes time irreversible. This is precisely why the new for Deleuze always remains new, the return as the return of an unchanging and unchanged one and the same is impossible. Here he resorts to the concept of the two deaths formulated by Maurice Blanchot. The first death is "empirical" in the particular sense of an interruption of the possibility of experience itself. The second death, on the contrary, is impersonal, the death of "everyone dies," it is death as a pure form, and hence the saturation with death of all time, of all its moments. It is the very form of the new as time, as the passing away and cancellation of what has emerged in the continuation of emergence. The new as the necessary death of the old, the destruction of the same by time as ceaseless change.

Having clarified the ontology of the new in Deleuze, it is time to see how the thread of literature that we are interested in works here through the reversal of Plato's mimesis. This is perhaps most easily traced in one of his texts, in which he states that he will take up Nietzsche's project of overturning Platonism - "Plato and the Simulacrum". The main point in his reading is the insistence that Plato's affirmation of the idea-copy conceptual pair has a normative rather than purely ontological motive at its core: the setting of a particular 'image of thought'. Hence, the "overturning of Platonism" in Deleuze turns out to be a matter of the project of thinking "without image" later stated in his *Difference and Repetition*. In his commentary on Plato, Deleuze emphasizes that the idea in the ancient thinker forms the difference between the object itself and the image, it is also a criterion for privileging the object itself over its image, in this sense it is a selective concept. The idea is not originally just some definition of being, but a mechanism for organizing our thinking as a process of distinguishing between model and copy, between original and semblance, between model and simulacrum.

But the last concept in this series for Deleuze turns out to escape the control of this model. According to him, in the simulacrum, Plato discovers "in a moment of enlightenment" his overhanging over an abyss - it is not just a fake copy, not just a bad copy, but questions the very separateness of the copy and the model, undermines the way of describing in the form of separation the relationship between the copy and its original. In this regard, Deleuze emphasizes the last criterion for distinguishing the sophist from the true philosopher in the dialogue "The Sophist": the sophist "is capable of pretending <...> in private, in short lines and by making his interlocutor contradict himself." But this is exactly the kind of behavior Plato imputes to the exemplary philosopher in his own texts - Socrates. The radical function of the simulacrum is to undermine any normative division between authentic and inauthentic claimants to truth. Insofar as Plato's simulacrum is an "imitation of an imitation" (which is, of course, his definition of poetry), Deleuze emphasizes that we should not envision a mere difference in degree here (just a more distant from the idea form of its copy), but a real difference in nature, since the simulacrum is an appearance without foundation in the identity of the idea. Identity for Plato is the primary, the criterion for distinguishing between similarity and difference, similarity is privileged, at the expense of difference. Deleuze's objection is that if we *install the simulacrum at the base, similarity and identity become derivative*.

Having said what the simulacrum does – it overturns and undermines the possibility of some kind of hierarchy that works along the axis of privileging the



identical and its reconciliation with the similar, but at the same time affirming the primacy of difference – Deleuze begins to talk about aesthetics and literature. Deleuze here, by contrast, asserts the simulacrum as an immanent process of ongoing productive differentiation, set in motion most emblematically in the narrative of modernist works involving more than one plotline. Each plotline is a series of differences (between events), and the series of a plotline itself refers to the series of differences between different events of another plotline by its difference with it. As an exemplary form of this unfolding of differences through their interrelation, Deleuze points to Joyce's *Finnegan's Wake*, where the powerful, almost unfathomable proliferation of plot lines is the effect of superimposing a profusion of differences that distinguish the very multiplicity of emplotment. That differences lead only to differences is defining for the process of the new in Deleuze's thinking, which is precisely the basis of his notion of heterogenesis. In Joyce's novel, there is not just heterogeneity, an accumulation of elements of different orders (for example, the superimposition of words with different etymologies in one word), but this very saturation of differences leads to the unfolding of other differences (divergent plots), i.e. difference is a principle of emergence without other presuppositions.

Deleuze, in "Plato and the Simulacrum", describes Joyce's novel with its proliferating plot lines directly with Simondon's vocabulary: an "internal resonance between the separate series that produces a forced movement" is formed. The idea of "resonance" here starts from Simondon's critique of the traditional conception of matter, according to which the relation between matter and form is thought of as external. On the contrary, for him matter gives itself form, Simondon's theory unfolds as a specific version of a theory of self-organization in nature. The starting point of individuation is the metastable states in matter. It is a question of states of a given material system in which there is an accumulation of potential energy due to a lack of communication, of connectivity between structures of the system. The metastable system is a problem, the solution of which is the transformation of the system itself, laying in communication, in "internal resonance" of the non-communicating in it. This kineticizes the potential energy, it starts flowing through new channels until some threshold is reached where the system enters a new metastable state, and so on.

We must, of course, emphasize that the reversal of Plato's mimesis into phantasm and simulacrum in Deleuze should not be understood as some supremacy of the unreal. On the contrary, the simulacrum is understood here as the fully real differential mechanism in the self-organization of matter, it is the virtual actualizing itself in a field of intensity. But it is also a triumph of fiction

over truth, a triumph of the false pretender in a superposition of masks. This for Deleuze is the false as a force, the force of the destruction of truth as the very form of eternity, the force of time, which has become a pure form of irreversibility. Here we can easily recognize in this force of the false the future and its second death. The false as an aspect of this creative condition of the future is the very combination of incompatible emplotments. Moreover, this compatibility of incompatibility as a condition of transformation is the very metastability of Simondon, giving, according to him, the impetus to invention.

As mentioned at the outset, Simondon develops his theory of individuation as a theory of invention in a technical context (i.e. as a technical invention). The metastable situation as an unstable and transformation-laden equilibrium, as we have already emphasized, is a problem. Invention, according to him, is a solution. In his lectures on invention, Simondon even develops this lesson into a fable: in the middle of a road along which individual travelers pass, each with their own rhythm and each according to their own trajectory, an obstructing rock has fallen. None of the passengers can remove the rock with their own strength, no single entity, locked in its own axis of motion, without communication with others, can solve this problem. The moment compatibility is built between the entities and they work together in the alignment of their forces, the moment, when conditions are set for the circulation of the potential energy cut off in their separateness, they already solve the problem. But this decision is actually the construction of an entirely new, collective subject, reconciling their previous incompatibility, without this subject having been presupposed before its emergence in any form. Simondon suggests that after the constitution of this entirely new entity, it will appear in retrospect that it was always possible. In fact, it turns out that invention itself includes this retroaction in its operation, positing the new, it also posits its context as presupposing, as giving support to this novelty. Invention is both the new and its presupposition. The positing of the new subject is also positing it as predetermined. The powers of the travelers were not compatible, the invention made them compatible, but also by default compatible before it. Thus, the invention is a leap beyond actuality, but it is not an invention, viewed from the point of view of the solution already found in it. By laying down the new, it cancels itself.

*Invention is producing something that was not predetermined, like discovering something that would have already been there.* This understanding of invention, traceable to Simondon's concept, reconciles its incompatible definitions.

In the Baroque authors, invention was related to wit, which unexpectedly connects unrelated things in metaphor, and this connection became thinkable as discovery, as knowledge. But the similarity, as Deleuze suggests against Baroque and against its successor Ricoeur, itself turns out to be secondary to difference, which is always the new.

The question of similarity is also a question of literature itself in terms of the concept of mimesis. As Deleuze suggests with his notion of simulacrum, mimesis is first and foremost, in itself, difference. I.e. mimesis is first of all mimesis as difference, and only then mimesis as the similarity of differences. Mimesis is primarily a fiction, the "force of the false" to create something new, and only then, again retrospectively, in its own "retroaction", in its "for itself", to find it as a model of which it is itself a likeness. Here it is appropriate to recall Aristotle's positioning of the illusion as overexposed in the very "constructedness" of the *mythos* - i.e. illusion as self-revealing and self-cancelling, as created, yet precisely as illusion. Creation as the creation of the appearance of uncreatedness brought to the point of its own cancellation. This is how mimesis and invention semantically meet - the positing of the new as representable, the invention of the new as the finding of the already existing. But perhaps still not as a coincidence, but rather as mutual dependency in a dynamic process: invention now as the feeling of novelty in contact with literature as its meaningful condition, then literature as conditioned by the invention, as an actualization of its concept.

### **Conclusion**

In summary, we can derive the following formulation: invention is in the process of inventing its own conditions, literary mimesis is in the process of creating its own premises, but both processes turn out to reciprocally lay down the conditioning of the very unconditionedness of the new. The interplay between these two modes of self-assignment seems to allow preserving and making conceivable the essential indeterminacy of the new as dependent on a transcendental horizon, itself presupposing the new in its constitution. This conditioning of unconditionality is a consequence of the new not coinciding with itself, multiplying as it is thinkable (according to Deleuze) through difference. Of course, this new is primarily a newness of meaning, but undoubtedly the comments deployed in the study suggest that meaning should not be deprived of claim for reality, with the proviso that this should not be done naively and immediately.

The research, of course, does not exhaust its topic. Are we not running the risk of accepting too quickly the radical insistence of Bergson and his followers

on the absolutization of the new? Moreover, isn't it right to return to a gesture familiar from Nietzsche and ask the question of the very value of the new? Undoubtedly, such questions require further effort, but for now they are beyond the scope of the inquiry we have deployed here.

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### **Contributions of the dissertation:**

1. The dissertation offers, for the first time in Bulgarian literary studies, a conceptualization of the new in and through literature through the lens of the notion of invention.
2. The history of the notion of invention, as well as that of the concept of mimesis, is traced through their intersection in the era of early modernity.

3. The complex conceptual dialectic in the transition of the concept of invention from establishment of a given to construction of novelty is outlined, in parallel with the similar movement in the concept of mimesis from reproduction to creativity.
4. A metatheoretical commentary on key claims in contemporary literary debates on the relationship between invention and literature is developed.
5. An original conceptual solution to the paradoxes, embedded in the meaning of invention and mimesis is derived: invention turns out to include the construction of its own conditions, and mimesis – the creation its own premises.

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